In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players through an aggregate population state. Each player has a private type that only she observes. Such games have been studied in the literature under simplifying assumption that population state dynamics are stationary. In this paper, we consider non-stationary population state dynamics and present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) that depend on both, a player's private type, and current (dynamic) population state. Using this algorithm, we study a security problem in cyberphysical system where infected nodes put negative externality on the system, and each node makes a decision to get vaccinated. We numerically compute MPE of the game.
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing amount of integration of technology in our society and with recent advancements in computation and algorithmic technologies, there is an unprecedented scale of interaction among people and devices. With technologies such as ride sharing platforms and social media apps completely integrated, and new technologies such as cyber physical systems, large scale renewable energy, electric vehicles, cryptocurrencies and smart grid on the horizon, there is paramount need to design and understand the behavior of such large scale interactions and their impact on our society. In this paper, we present a new methodology to analyze such interactions through mean-field dynamic games. May 13, 2019 DRAFT Dynamic games is a powerful tool to model such sequential strategic interaction among selfish players. There are many other applications such as dynamic auctions, security, markets, traffic routing, wireless systems, social learning, oligopolies-i.e. competition among firms, and more.
For instance, consider repeated online advertisement auctions, where advertisers place bids for locations on a website to sell a product. These bids are calculated based on the value of that product, which is privately observed by the advertiser and past actions of other advertisers, which are observed publicly. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize its reward, which for an auction depends on the actions taken by others.
When players have complete information, an appropriate solution concept for such games is
Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) [1] , where players' strategies depend on a coarser Markovian state of the systems, instead of the whole history of the game which grows exponentially with time and thus becomes unwieldy. In general, there exists a backward recursive methodology to compute non-signaling MPEs of a game i.e. when players' actions do not reveal any payoff relevant private information. However, when the number of players is large, computing MPE becomes intractable
To model the behavior of large population strategic interactions, mean-field games were introduced independently by Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [2] , and Lasry and Lions [3] . In such games, there are large number of homogenous strategic players, where each player has infinitesimal affect on system dynamics and is affected by other players through a mean-field population state. There have been a number of applications such as economic growth, security in networks, oil production, volatility formation, population dynamics (see [4] - [9] and references therein).
In this paper, to model the scenarios described above we consider discounted infinite-horizon dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogenous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players through a mean-field population state. Each player has a private type that evolves through a controlled Markov process which only she observes and all players observe the current population state which is the distribution of other players' types.
The work closest to ours is [10] where authors considered a model in which they studied stationary equilibria of a mean-field game. In such games, the mean-field dynamics are given by
McKean Vlasov equations which are coupled together with the strategies of the players. Authors DRAFT May 13, 2019 in [10] make simplifying assumption on the model that the players are oblivious with respect to the mean-field statistics, and are playing in the limit such that the mean-field distribution has converged. This allows them to decouple the mean-field dynamics with that of the rest of the game.
In this paper, we remove that assumption and consider a more general and realistic model where players are cognizant i.e. they actively observe the current population state (which need not have converged) and act based on that population state and their own private state. In such systems, the update of population state depends on the symmetric equilibrium strategy of the players while equilibrium strategies are computed using equilibrium update. Thus equilibrium strategies and population update are interlinked together. We provide a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute non-stationary, signaling Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of that game.
Using this framework, we consider malware spread problem in a cyber-physical system where nodes get infected by an independent random process and for each node, there is a higher risk of getting infected due to negative externality imposed by other infected players. At each time t, each player privately observes its own state and publicly observes the population of infected nodes, based on which it has to make a decision to repair or not. Using our algorithm, we find equilibrium strategies of the players which are observed to be non-decreasing in the healthy population state.
Our algorithm is motivated by recent developments in the theory of dynamic games with asymmetric information in [11] - [15] , where authors in these works have considered different models of such games and provided a sequential decomposition framework to compute Markovian perfect Bayesian equilibria of such games.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. 
) be the fraction of population having type x ∈ X at time t i.e.
where Nx i=1 z t (i) = 1. Player i's type evolve as a controlled Markov process,
The random variables (w i t ) i,t are assumed to be mutually independent across players and across time. We also write the above kernel as
In any period t, player i observes (z 1:t , x i 1:t ). She takes action a i t according to a behavioral strategy
For finite time-horizon game, G T , each player wants to maximize its total expected discounted reward over a time horizon T , discounted by discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1,
For the infinite time-horizon game, G ∞ , each player wants to maximize its total expected discounted reward over an infinite-time horizon discounted by discount factor 0 < δ < 1,
We are only interested in symmetric equilibria of such games such that
there is no dependence of i on the strategies of the players. For a given symmetric prescription function γ t = θ[z t ], the statistical mean-field z t evolves according to the discrete-time McKean Vlasov equation, ∀y ∈ X :
which implies
A. Backward recursive algorithm for G T
In this subsection, we will provide a methodology to generate MPE of G T of the form described above. We define an equilibrium generating function
where for each z t , we generateγ t = θ t [z t ]. In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function
, where V t : Z × X → R. These quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation as follows.
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀z t , let θ t [z t ] be generated as follows. Setγ t = θ t [z t ], whereγ t is the solution of the following fixed-point equation 2 
Then, an equilibrium strategy is defined as
Theorem 1. A strategy (σ) constructed from the above algorithm is an MPE of the game i.e.
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
B. Backward recursive algorithm for G ∞
For the infinite-horizon problem, we assume the reward function R to be absolutely bounded.
We define an equilibrium generating function θ : Z → {X → P(A)}, where for each z t , we
In addition, we generate a reward-to-go function V : Z × X → R. These quantities are generated through a fixed-point equation as follows.
For all z, setγ = θ[z]. Then (γ, V ) are solution of the following fixed-point equation 3 ,
where expectation in (14) is with respect to random variable
Then an equilibrium strategy is defined as
Theorem 2. A strategy (σ) constructed from the above algorithm is an MPE of the game i.e.
C. Existence
In this section, we prove existence of a solution of fixed-point equations (10) and (14). Proof. Please see Appendix F.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: CYBER PHYSICAL SECURITY
We first consider a security problem in a cyber physical network with positive externalities. It is discretized version of the malware problem presented in [7] - [9] , [17] . 
where w i t ∈ {0, 1} is a binary valued random variable with P (w i t = 1) = q, which represents the probability of a node getting infected. Thus if a node doesn't do anything, it could get infected with certain probability, however, if it takes repair action, it comes back to the healthy state.
Each node gets a reward
DRAFT May 13, 2019 where z t (1) is the mean-field population state being 1 at time t, λ is the cost of repair and (k + z t (1)) represents the risk of being infected. We pose it as an infinite horizon discounted dynamic game. We consider k = 0.2, λ = 0.5, δ = 0.9, q = 0.9 for numerical results presented in Figures 1-4 . In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon, large population dynamic game where each player is affected by others through a mean-field population state. We present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute non-stationary, signaling Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) for such games, where each player's strategy depends on its current private type and current mean-field population state. The non-triviality in the problem is that the update of population state is coupled to the strategies of the game, and is managed in the algorithm through unique construction of the fixed-point equations (10), (14) . Using this algorithm, we considered a malware propagation problem where we numerically computed equilibrium strategies of the players. In general, this algorithm could be used to compute MPEs in a number of applications such as financial markets, social learning, renewable energy and more. For base case at t = T , ∀i ∈ N , (z 1:T , x
where (19a) follows from Lemma 2 and (19b) follows from Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t + 1, ∀i ∈ N , z 1: Reward to go when state is 1 
where ( APPENDIX B
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, σ
We will show that this leads to a contradiction. Construct
Then for z 1:t , x i 1:t , we have
where (25a) follows from definition of V t in (11), (25c) follows from definition of γ i t and (25d) follows from (23). However this leads to a contradiction.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
where (27b) follows from the definition of V t in (11) . Suppose the claim is true for t + 1, i.e.,
Then ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (z 1:t , x i 1:t ) ∈ H i t , we have 
APPENDIX C
We divide the proof into two parts: first we show that the value function V is at least as big as any reward-to-go function; secondly we show that under the strategyσ, reward-to-go is V .
Note that h 
Since X , A are finite sets the reward R is absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go W
Combining results from Lemmas 4 and 5 in Appendix D, the term in the first bracket in RHS of (31) is non-negative. Using (30), the term in the second bracket is
DRAFT May 13, 2019 The summation in the expression above is bounded by a convergent geometric series. Also, V is bounded. Hence the above quantity can be made arbitrarily small by choosing T appropriately large. Since the LHS of (31) does not depend on T , which implies,
Part 2: Since the strategy the equilibrium strategyσ generated in (15) 
For any h
Repeated application of the above for the first n time periods gives
Taking differences results in
Taking absolute value of both sides then using Jensen's inequality for f (x) = |x| and finally taking supremum over h i t reduces to
Now using the fact that W t+n , V are bounded and that we can choose n arbitrarily large, we get Here agent i's strategy is σ i whereas all other agents use strategyσ −i defined above. Since X , A are assumed to be finite and G absolutely bounded, the reward-to-go is finite ∀ i, t, σ i , z 1:t , x i 1:t . In the following, any quantity with a T in the superscript refers the finite horizon model with terminal reward G. 
The result below shows that the value function from the backwards recursive algorithm is higher than any reward-to-go. 
Here the second inequality follows from (10) 
where || · || ∞ is the sup norm. By a similar argument, T V 2 (z,
Thus T is a contraction mapping. Therefore from Banach fixed-point theorem [18] , there exists a unique fixed point to T , T V = V . Correspondingly, there exists θ (V ) such thatγ = θ (V ) [z] together with V is a solution to (14) .
